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China and Central Asia
Valérie Niquet
EDITOR'S NOTE
Translated by Nick Oates
1 The interest of the People’s Republic of China in Central Asia is not new. It has always
been related to issues concerning the extension and control of the country’s territory
as well as its territorial security. A sign of this complex interest, official visits to the
Central  Asian  republics  since  their  independence  have  succeeded  each  other  at  a
sustained rhythm following prime minister Li Peng’s first tour in 1994.
2 The guiding thread of Chinese policy with regard to Central Asia is thus essentially one
of “stability”,  leitmotiv of  the current political  authority,  in a continuum that runs
from internal stability, that of the traditionally restless regions such as Xinjiang, to the
stability of the frontier zones and of the periphery, from where may emerge, since the
end of the Cold War, a whole new series of risks1.
3 Since the collapse of  the Soviet  system and the independence of  the Central  Asian
republics,  which  has  led  to  a  fragmentation  and  a  relative  autonomisation  of  the
region, the stakes, and the opportunities, for the People’s Republic of China have been
greatly complicated, and this movement is far from concluded today. In 1989, the first
fruits of the end of communism in the USSR―greater liberty granted to the Soviet
republics of Central Asia―had coincided in China with the resurgence of a democratic
movement that found expression in Beijing around the students in Tiananmen Square
but also in the autonomous region of Xinjiang, which has since experienced numerous
periods of agitation2.
4 To begin with, following the end of the Cold War and the disappearance of the Soviet
threat, it seemed that the bilateral dimension of relations between China and Central
Asia  would  win  the  day,  in  an  initially  rather  positive  direction  involving  the
development of exchanges, with the opening of frontier posts allowing traditional ties
to be rewoven and with the themes surrounding the “new Silk Road”. This was also the
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period  in  which the  final  stretch  of  the  Yili-Yining  railway  linking  Xinjiang  with
Kazakhstan  was  constructed;  it  had  been  interrupted  because  of  the  Sino-Soviet
conflict.  Following  the  violent  pro-independence  incidents  in  Yining  in  1997,  the
Chinese government reinforced its control over cross-frontier exchanges.
5 More recently, the emergence of concerns related to the role of NATO and the United
States has added a more global dimension to this consideration of the risks, while today
the new ambitions asserted by a more self-confident Russia―even if  the means for
Moscow to take action remain limited―have again complicated the stakes3.
The internal stability dimension
6 The stability of Xinjiang lies at the heart of the concerns surrounding the security of
the  People’s  Republic  of  China,  and  it  constitutes  one  of  the  primary  factors
determining  China’s  policy  towards  Central  Asia.  The  problems  of  economic
development and political control are in fact far from resolved in Xinjiang, a province
that was only officially integrated into the Qing Empire in 1884, and which remains a
“disputed periphery”,  to  use  the  expression  coined by  Thierry  Kellner,  despite  the
implementation  since  the  end  of  the  1980s  by  the  central  authorities  of  multiple
strategies of both repression and development4. These strategies can be summarised in
two slogans: that of the “hit hard” campaigns, launched in 1996, which are not solely
targeted  at  Xinjiang  but  which  are  translated  in  the  province  into  heightened
repression5,  and that of the “west development” supposed to extend the benefits of
growth to this province far removed from the large centres of development. However,
since the ascension to power of Hu Jintao, it seems that this campaign has become the
object of some disaffection on the part of the central authorities in the face of multiple
social tensions, also in the more developed regions.
7 At the economic level,  Xinjiang is in fact not only confronted with a differential  in
development  that  remains  significant  in  relation to  the  national  average  but,  even
more destabilising,  with a  persistent,  not  to  say increasing,  inequality  between the
population  of  Chinese  Han  origin, which  today  comprises  almost  50%  of  the  local
population, and the indigenous population characterised, ethnically and culturally, by
an identification with all of the populations of Central Asia.
8 This identification has of course played its part in the resumption of exchanges with
the  re-opening  of  the  frontiers  and  the  large  communication  flows  following  the
collapse of  the USSR,  but  the development of  exchanges and the period of  relative
liberalisation that  China has experienced since the beginning of  the 1980s has also
encouraged  the  re-emergence  of  autonomist  currents.  The  strategy  of  control  by
occupation, which has been translated in a considerable increase in the population of
Han origin in the region―accelerating from 6% of the total population of Xinjiang in
1949, with 300,000 people, to 40.6% of the total in 2000, with 7.5 million people, an
increase of more than 2,200% in 50 years―also constitutes a subject of resentment.
9 In  this  objective  of  controlling  territory  at  the  marches  of  the  empire  (which,
moreover, resumes a model initiated in the Han dynasty (202-220) with the institution
of  peasant  soldiers),  the  role  played  by  the  production  and  construction  units  in
Xinjiang entrusted with exploiting the agricultural land and controlling the frontiers is
far from marginalised, in contrast to what has happened in the rest of the country
where the people’s communes have disappeared. Following a period of opening up that
had characterised the end of the 1980s, the central government has put the emphasis
back on the control and the rematerialisation of the frontiers6.
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10 In  terms  of  strategic  priority,  the  defence  of  the  frontiers  and  the  control  of  the
borderlands still constitute an essential mission of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA),
even though they attract less attention than the “external” targets of projection of the
Chinese strategy,  for  example  overseas  or  in  the  direction  of  Taiwan,.  Thus  it  has
recently  been  decided  to  reinforce  the  technological  standards  of  the  police  units
entrusted, together with the PLA, with the defence of the frontiers. The improvement
of the infrastructures for the defence of the frontiers in Xinjiang, such as the road
network and the control barriers, also represent a priority that shows a tendency to be
reinforced rather than reduced7.
11 But although the factors of internal destabilisation do exist, for Beijing it is equally
evident that control of Xinjiang entails control of the periphery and of cross-border
contacts.  Thus,  while  the  central  authority  has  insisted  on  the  instigation  of  good
relations  with  all  the  new  republics  of  Central  Asia,  a  directive  from  the  Central
Committee of the PCC underlined in 1996 the necessity of obtaining from Kazakhstan
and Kyrgyzstan a promise not to give support to the Uighur or Kazakh independence
movements originating in Xinjiang8.
Internal control and “border stability”
12 Internal  control  and  the  maintenance  of  order  depend  in  fact,  for  the  Chinese
authorities, on control of the border aimed at preventing any “contamination” and any
external  support  for  the  independence  movements.  Indeed,  while  the  internal
destabilisation  factors  are  frequently  noted,  in  particular  those  linked  to  the
inequalities of economic development, the movements of discontent that are regularly
expressed in Xinjiang are essentially perceived in reality, and denounced by the central
authorities, as the result of destabilising manoeuvres originating from outside and that
aim to weaken China and put a brake on its emergence as a superpower.
13 The strategy of stabilising the periphery, which forms part of the “border policy” put in
place by a reform-minded China, linked to the theories of the pacifist rise, constitutes
the theoretical  foundation of  this  strategy that  aims to “persuade” and reassure in
order to  better  mollify  in the absence of  any real  means of  coercion.  All  of  this  is
termed “the principal challenge and objective of China’s foreign policy”9.
14 This strategy is also based on a “new concept of security” intended to promote “mutual
trust,  equality,  mutual  benefits  and co-ordination”,  a  kind of  non-binding,  Chinese-
style multilateralism.
15 As far as Central Asia is concerned, this strategy of border stabilisation has at the same
time been translated by the concern in an initial period to resolve all of the frontier
questions inherited from the Soviet era in a sense rather more favourable to the new
Central Asian republics with which Beijing wished to establish good relations. On these
positive foundations, China then put in place a strategy of alliance against separatism,
which has gradually taken the more established form of the fight against the “three
forces of evil” represented by terrorism, extremism and separatism.
16 These elements, which also appear as a response to the themes of the “axis of evil”
preached by the United States since the early years of the millennium, have similarly
incorporated  a  commitment  on  the  part  of  the  Asian  republics  not  to  support  the
separatist movements originating in Xinjiang, a commitment that, ideally, should lead
to  active  co-operation  in  terms  of  repression  and  repatriation  of  the  “separatists
elements” sought by Beijing10.
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17 This element was all the more important given that more than 400,000 Uighur have
settled in Central Asia, over 300,000 of which in Kazakhstan alone, where family ties are
tight. Moreover, a dozen or so Uighur organisations have been tolerated in Kazakhstan
despite agreements signed with Beijing11. China has in fact put in place a co-operation
network in the military realm and for the maintenance of order. For China, this was
essentially a question of breaking an evident cultural, linguistic, ethnic and religious
community between Xinjiang and the Central Asian republics in order to construct, in
contrast,  a  community  of  interests,  linked  to  the  nature  of  the  regimes  in  power,
between the central authorities.  But while reinforcing the “strategic” links between
China  and  Central  Asia,  it  was  necessary  for  Beijing  at  the  same  time  to  deny  or
minimise the natural and historical integration of Xinjiang with this whole region of
Central Asia.
18 The recognition of the “common security issues,” foremost among which are terrorism
and separatism, which, as Beijing underlines, “pose a threat to the leadership position
of the authorities of all the regional powers,” has thus constituted the primary element
of the implementation of genuine collaboration in security matters between China and
the Central Asian republics.
19 The Shanghai Group, set up in 1996 and which brought together the People’s Republic
of China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Russia, had as its official mission the
resolution  of  frontier  questions,  the  reduction  of  military  tensions  and  the
implementation  of confidence-building  measures;  more  generally,  it  thus  aimed  to
move from a status of confrontation to one of co-operation in a zone still profoundly
marked by the Sino-Soviet conflict12. In a sign of goodwill on the part of China, it was
during his trip to Central Asia in 1996 that Jiang Zemin announced the suspension by
China of its nuclear test programme, while the question of the tests and the risks of
pollution was particularly sensitive in Kazakhstan and also represented an element of
the dispute in Xinjiang itself.
20 At  the  bilateral  level,  China  has  similarly  instituted  with  all  of  the  Central  Asian
countries a series of “strategic partnerships”, the full titles of which nevertheless bear
witness to a fine graduation in relations. With Kazakhstan, the partnership is termed
“strategic”, this is the highest level, and Kazakhstan is also the most sensitive state for
reasons relating to its geographic proximity, to the narrow ties that exist with Xinjiang
but also, as we will see, to the potential for co-operation in the field of energy. With the
other  republics,  on  the  other  hand,  the terms  are  much  less  “strategic”.  With
Kyrgyzstan, there is a “partnership of good neighbourliness and friendly co-operation”,
with  Uzbekistan  a  “partnership  of  friendly  co-operation”,  with  Tajikistan  a
“partnership of good neighbourliness and friendly co-operation directed towards the
21st century” and with Turkmenistan “relations of friendly co-operation for the 21st
century on the basis of equality and the common interest”. But beyond the concern for
stability, for Beijing, following the fall of the USSR, there is also the question in this
sensitive region of expanding its sphere of influence or privileged interest.
The dream of expanding the sphere of Chinese influence
21 Reflecting a sensitive concern in the region, even if it is openly expressed only rarely
and often only appears between the lines, a Chinese analyst wrote recently that “China
will never attempt to draw Central Asia into its zone of influence and does not have the
intention of bringing its resources under its control”. If the second part of the phrase,
very significantly devoted to resources, constitutes a new element, the first part takes
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up virtually in the same terms the declarations of Li Peng during his first tour of the
region in 1994 following the proclamations of independence13. The reiteration indicates
in fact that the conviction of these statements is undoubtedly not as strong as Beijing
might have hoped for.
22 Indeed, for an initial period, it seemed that the collapse of the USSR would offer China
an  undreamed-of  opportunity  to  expand  its  zone  of  influence  or,  at  least,  of
“benevolent neutrality” in a region that had until  then been inaccessible to it.  But,
while  in the course of  the 1990s  this  strategy of  reinforcing Chinese influence was
limited  to  the  strategic-diplomatic  realm,  since  the  beginning  of  this  century,  and
particularly following the terrorist attacks of September 11th 2001, which brought with
them a real disruption in the strategic situation in Central Asia, Beijing has also placed
emphasis on reinforcing co-operation in the economic field.
23 The economic strategy that China is pursuing in Central Asia can be analysed at several
levels. It appears to be a prolongation of the development strategy for western China,
with one aim being the opening up of Xinjiang and the economic development of the
province in order to cool tensions there. But Beijing applies the same analysis to the
republics of Central Asia, the economic backwardness of which is denounced as one of
the causes of the social tensions and of the rise of Islamic terrorism14. Moreover, and
this is a relatively new element, Central Asia appears today to be both a market for
Chinese products, beyond the border exchanges, but also a source of energy supply, the
importance of which has grown considerably for China.
24 China is  thus  encouraging,  with  nevertheless qualified  success,  the  development  of
infrastructure intended to facilitate the trade with Central Asia as well as the opening
up of Xinjiang. The transport network, in particular the road and air network, has been
considerably strengthened with trans-Central Asia motorway projects linking Andijan
Osh and Kashgar and passing via the strategic route of Karakorum in order to open up
the southern part of Xinjiang. The last agreement signed in 2005 with Pakistan provides
for  important  works  that  will  allow  the  Karakorum  highway  to  be  open  to  traffic
throughout the year.
25 The strategic and security dimension of these projects is obviously not absent, but the
newer economic dimension is also essential. Since 1986, the year of its reestablishment
and  in  particular  since  1992,  border  trade  has  developed  considerably.  In  2003,  it
accounted for 50% of the province’s total trade15. More than 28 crossing points have
been opened, and in 2004 an agreement with Kazakhstan was signed to open a free
trade zone centred on Khorgos.
26 However,  the  role  of  Xinjiang  appears  essentially  to  be  that  of a  transit  route  for
products that are exported to Central Asia but the vast majority of which come from its
more  developed  neighbouring  provinces.  This  fact  means,  however,  that  the
development  of  trade,  which  largely  remains  in  the  hands  of  the Han community,
constitutes another source of  frustration.  On the other side of  the border,  it  is  the
invasion of  the markets  by the Han traders,  such as  has happened in Almaty,  that
provokes  a  sense  of  unease.  Chinese  economic  dynamism  thus  plays  a  part  in
reinforcing a common feeling of exclusion that affects the local populations both in
Xinjiang and in Central Asia.
27 But,  beyond access to a  new market for the less  sophisticated of  Chinese products,
Central Asia, and Kazakhstan in particular, represent for China a major interest in the
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matter of energy, and projects that for a period had slowed down for reasons of costs
and the absence of any real sense of urgency have recently been reactivated by Beijing.
28 In 1994, the China National Petroleum Company (CNPC) acquired 60% of the shares in
the Kazakh company Aktobemunaj Gaz, which has been exploiting the Aktyubinsk field.
In 1997, a joint venture agreement was signed with the company Uzemunigaz to exploit
the Uzen field. In August 2005, CNPC also initiated the acquisition of Petrokazakhstan,
and was supported in this project by the Kazakh authorities.
29 On the other hand, the pipeline projects requiring heavy investments, which foreign, in
particular Japanese, companies, have not been prepared to make for both economic and
strategic  reasons,  have  for  a  long  time  experienced  considerable  delays  despite
recurrent projects promising to link the gas or oil fields of Central Asia, in particular in
Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, up to the Chinese market.
30 In economic terms, the aim of supplying energy to China’s coastal regions, which are
the most developed and the heaviest consumers, had appeared to lack incentives given
the very high costs of exploitation and transport. The stakes have recently changed,
however, for reasons that are both economic, with the increase in the cost of oil, and
strategic, with the strengthening of the American military presence in the Middle East,
China’s primary source of oil imports.
31 In  December  2005,  a  first  section  998  kilometres  long  linking  the  oil  fields  of
Kazakhstan to Xinjiang’s northeast via the Alashan Pass was completed; the aim was to
extend this  network  in  the  direction  of  eastern  China  towards  Shanghai.  There  is,
however, still a very long way to go to turn round completely in the direction of China
and Asia the Kazakh export networks, which are essentially oriented towards Russia
and the Caspian Sea. But with the construction of this pipeline,  China is increasing
Kazakhstan’s  room for  manoeuvre and negotiation,  with the latter  thus  gaining an
additional partner alongside Russia and the United States. On the other hand, the gas
pipeline projects linking Xinjiang to Turkmenistan have still not gone anywhere16.
32 But beyond these preoccupations, Chinese policy with regard to Central Asia possesses
a more global dimension related to the reinforcement of the American presence in the
region.
China confronted with the American offensive towards Central Asia
33 Starting in the first half of the 1990s, following the break-up of the USSR, China very
quickly  became  worried  about  the  links  interwoven  between  the new  republics  of
Central Asia and NATO, perceiving a risk that the influence of the United States would
be extended under a rationale of “containment” of Chinese power. In a reflection of
this  concern,  China  launched  research  programmes  concentrating  on  NATO,  for
example,  and  exhibited  a  new  desire  to  establish  direct  contacts  with  NATO
representatives17. For Beijing, this was in fact very clearly an issue of an “offensive by
external forces that are attempting to control the security questions in the region”.
34 China was particularly interested in the joint  exercises organised for the first  time
between NATO and Kazakhstan in 1993 within the framework of NATO’s Partnership for
Peace18. Beijing also fretted about the enlargement of the room to manoeuvre and of
autonomy in terms of decision-making of the new republics of Central Asia who, as one
analyst  has  candidly  underlined,  “only  taking into  consideration their  self-interest,
pursue with energy their own external security strategy”19.
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35 This expansion of NATO to the east, despite its limits, was thus analysed as a threat to
the security of China’s northeast frontier, which, moreover, has always constituted a
zone that the Chinese authorities have been preoccupied with. This threat comprises
both  a  conventional  dimension  related  to  the  ratcheting  up  of  American  military
pressure, but equally an ideological threat related to the theories of peaceful evolution
or regime change.
36 According to Beijing, this threat is exacerbated today, in particular since the attacks of
September 11th, which led to a reinforcement of the military presence of the United
States in Central Asia thanks to the opening of several military bases, but also an even
greater emphasis placed by Washington on the link it has established between regime
change, democratisation and security.
37 This implantation of American bases in Central Asia after the September 11th attacks,
without the countries of the region who belong to the Shanghai Group even consulting
Beijing, has thus represented for China a significant setback of its policy towards the
Central  Asian  countries  and  has  imposed  the  implementation  of  a  new  strategy  of
reconquest, the result of which has not been perfectly satisfactory for Beijing.
The readjustment of Chinese policy with regard to Central Asia
38 After the attacks of  September 11th,  China attempted to regain the upper hand by
aligning itself  for  an initial  period with the  seemingly  common theme of  the fight
against  terrorism.  This  theme in  fact  allowed Beijing  to  distinguish  itself  from the
countries of the “axis of evil”, to whom China was in reality very close, but at the same
time to insist that its own analysis of the terrorist and separatist threat in Xinjiang be
recognised. The success of this strategy can be found in the registering by Washington
of  ETIM  (East  Turkestan  Independence  Movement),  a  nevertheless  very  marginal
movement, on its list of terrorist organisations.
39 This highlighting of a strategic interest shared in common with the United States has,
however, not produced the expected results for Beijing, in particular as far as Central
Asia is concerned. According to China, the theories of regime change, set in motion
through the intermediary of certain NGOs supported by the United States, who praise
especially  the  emergence  of  independent  media  promoting  the  expression  of
opposition,  have  in  contrast  been  reinforced20.  According  to  Chinese  analyses,  the
“colour revolutions” that have been fomented in the countries of the former Soviet
bloc (Georgia, Ukraine) and above all the “tulip revolution” in Kyrgyzstan, as well as
the  events  that  occurred  in  Uzbekistan  in  2005,  were  in  fact  only  the  result  of
destabilisation  efforts  on  the  part  of  the  United  States,  which  had  the  goal  of
reinforcing its zone of influence.
40 For Beijing, the risk would obviously be that, in line with the domino theory, these
destabilisation  movements  expand  to  the  whole  of  Central  Asia  and  reach  the
autonomous region of Xinjiang. Moreover, the Chinese analysts place this American
strategy in the continuation of the fight against communism, since the Cold War, the
theory of humanitarian intervention, the war on terror, and up to the theory of the
removal of “tyrannies” expressed by Condoleeza Rice. By doing so, China, significantly,
is  strongly  reaffirming  its  ideological  specificity,  despite  the  policy  of  economic
reforms that the regime has pursued for more than 25 years, but also attempting to
recreate a kind of complicity with the Central Asian regimes that have emerged from
the former Soviet nomenklatura21.
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41 For the Chinese analysts, after, indeed to a certain extent “thanks” to, the attacks of
September  11th,  the  goal  of  the  United  States  has  been  “to  acquire  a  strategic
superiority in Central Asia by means of a military and ideological penetration”. China
thus denounces the reinforcement of the military co-operation with the countries of
Central Asia, the opening of bases and the agreements in matters of trade and training
in the military sphere22. Beijing is also preoccupied with the multiplication of high-level
visits by American leaders to the region, which have come in quick succession since the
beginning of the decade23.
42 The United States has also reinforced its presence at the economic level through the
multiplication  of  aid  and  investments,  including  in  the  field  of  energy,  which  is  a
particularly  sensitive  one  for  Beijing.  China  has  noted  that  after  the  attacks  of
September 11th the United States has, for the first time in history, had access to more
than  ten  airports  in  the  region,  without  counting  the  military  bases  set  up in
Uzbekistan  and  Kyrgyzstan24.  Thus,  despite  a  discourse  that  incessantly  recalls  the
principle of win-win, the Chinese regime continues in reality to analyse the parameters
of its security in terms of an asymmetry in its favour and a capacity to control and
influence, as is demonstrated by the privileged ties woven by China with regimes that
are especially isolated on the international stage. The increased room to manoeuvre
offered to the countries of Central Asia thanks to the implied involvement of the United
States thus appears for Beijing as a setback in relation to the situation that had seemed
to prevail in the course of the 1990s.
China’s bypass strategies: the triumph of pragmatism
43 Facing up to this  offensive on the part of  the United States,  China has successfully
demonstrated a  remarkable  capacity  for  adaptation  and  reaction.  Abandoning  to  a
certain degree the discourse of  the common fight against  terrorism, which has not
brought with it any major evolution within the current American administration as far
as its analysis of the Chinese regime is concerned, Beijing has in contrast conducted an
ideological realignment in the direction of the less democratic regimes, attempting to
play off a common interest against the rise in power of the United States and threats of
regime change. The goal here is to reduce the influence of the United States in the
region while creating a new rationale for an alliance with the Chinese regime.
44 Russia has a role to play in this process. However, for Beijing, the return of a strong
Russia  to  Central  Asia  is  no  longer  considered  a  positive  point.  As  in  the  case  of
relations  with  Japan or  India,  the  fact  that  Moscow  is  today  emphasising  the
recognition  of  its  own  economic  and  strategic  interests  over  those  of  the  “Russo-
Chinese strategic partnership” also constitutes a subject of preoccupation for Beijing
on account of the elements of uncertainty related to it.
45 Thus, in Central Asia, the Chinese analysts class as an “unfavourable factor” the role of
external forces, primary among which is the United States as we have seen, but also the
integration of the countries of Central Asia “in the organisations of collective security
of the CIS”. In reality, Beijing, going beyond the discourse of collusion surrounding a
strategic  partnership  with  Moscow,  which  was  expressed  in  particular  in  the
organisation of joint naval manoeuvres in the China Sea in 2005, seems just as much to
deplore “the persistent influence of the CIS, which is playing a much more important
role in Central Asia”25. In fact, Russia, confronted with the rise in power of the United
States but also faced with China, is trying to preserve a significant military presence in
Central Asia by maintaining its own network of bases and privileged relations26.
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The Shanghai Co-operation Organisation: the instrument of pragmatism
46 In  order  to  respond  to  these  complex  challenges,  which  have,  moreover,  evolved
considerably over time as we have seen, China has relied on a mechanism that is itself
evolutionary:  the  Shanghai  Cooperation  Organisation  (SCO).  Although  it  no  longer
corresponds today to what it could have been at the time of its creation in 1995 under
the  name  of  the  “Group  of  Five”,  whatever  the  evolution,  the  SCO’s  fundamental
objectives remain as they were at its establishment. For Beijing, these are to counter
the penetration of the United States in the region; to promote the reinforcement of
Chinese influence; to play a part in the stabilisation of the marches and frontier zones;
and possibly to be able to present it as a “new model for international relations” that
could be extended to the rest of Asia.
47 At the time of its creation in 1996, the Shanghai Group (which was to be expanded in
2001  to  include  Uzbekistan  and  adopt  the  new name  of  the  SCO)  was  intended  to
reinforce the cooperation and define a new framework for relations between China and
the former Soviet republics of Central Asia following the disappearance of the Soviet
threat.  It  was also a question,  and this is  the “model” aspect that is  found here as
elsewhere in Africa in particular, of creating “a new economic and democratic political
order, that was just and reasonable” according to the principles of mutual trust, mutual
benefits, regular consultation and respect for different cultures. This last point may
well appear as a concession on the part of China, itself confronted with the “cultural
specificity” of the autonomous region of Xinjiang.
48 On the  other  hand,  China’s  overriding  strategic  interests  were  heavily  emphasised:
opposition,  at  that time,  to any reconsideration of  the ABM treaty;  support for the
Chinese  positions  concerning Taiwan and Tibet;  and opposition to  any “separatist”
manoeuvre.
49 With regard to these, for China, essential goals, the attacks of September 11th 2001
represented a genuine turning point and a reason for disappointment when faced with
the  fragility  of  the  structure  built  up  since  1996.  All  of  the  member  countries
demonstrated  in  2001  their  support  for  the  United  States,  Russia  accepted  the
abrogation of the ABM treaty and the Central Asian republics authorised the opening of
American military bases on their territory.
50 Having to a large extent lost the initiative within the SCO, China therefore began to
reorient its strategy, which from that point on has insisted on the economic and energy
co-operation dimension as well as on that of the common fight against the attempts at
regime change encouraged by Washington.
51 As one Chinese analyst has recognised, following the attacks of September 11th, any
frontal opposition to the presence of the United States in the region had no chance of
succeeding, and China thus had to find divergent means to rebuild, progressively and
based on other factors, its influence in the region27.
52 For  an  initial  period,  Beijing  thus  insisted  on  the  fight  against  terrorism,  without
however  obtaining  any  genuine  reorientation  of  American  strategy  in its  favour.
Beijing has also highlighted the common fight against non-traditional risks. Here too,
however, it has not taken into account the real issues in matters such as pollution and
water management in so far as they call into question the principle of non-restrictive
unilateralism in the management of its resources that Beijing continues to promote
where it finds itself in a position to impose it28. But, in a tangible example of the co-
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operation in the fight against the new risks, joint manoeuvres were organised at the
bilateral and multilateral level in 2003 and 200429.
53 At the economic level, Beijing proposed in 2003, in accordance with a strategy that can
be  found  everywhere  in Asia,  the  establishment  of  a  free  trade  zone based  on
highlighting the potential of the Chinese market and the supposed complementarity of
the Chinese and Central Asian economies. China has similarly proposed that a working
group on energy be set up with the intention of facilitating large-scale trans-border
projects such as the construction of pipelines30.  At the political level, bilateral visits
have been multiplied and several working groups have been set up. During the 2004
SCO summit, a development aid programme for the countries of the region based on
low-interest loans was also initiated by China. Nevertheless, Beijing remains a minor
actor in Central Asia despite a very pointed discourse. Its principal partner remains
Kazakhstan.  But,  even in  this  case,  Russia  continues  to  be  by  far  Astana’s  primary
commercial partner. In terms of investment, it is the Western countries (72% of the
total) who have taken the lead, with the United States (40% of the total) predominant,
followed by Russia and then by China (3% of the total)31.
54 However,  as  a  result  of  this  patient  bypass  strategy,  which  attempts  to  put  the
emphasis on a Chinese-style soft power, during the SCO summit that was held in Astana
in July 2005 China and Kazakhstan signed a strategic partnership agreement, founded
in particular on Beijing’s strong support for the principle of political stasis as opposed
to that of regime change preached by the United States. The accent was also put on the
common fight of all of the SCO members not simply, as in the case of the United States,
against  terrorism alone  but  against  “terrorism,  separatism and extremism”.  At  the
institutional level, China only obtained one arm, also established in Shanghai, of the
Regional  Anti-terrorist  Structure  (RATS),  which  comes  under  the  predominant
influence of Russia,  since the structure was set up in Tashkent in 200332.  Primarily,
Beijing demanded that a deadline for the closure of American bases in the region be
fixed and obtained from Uzbekistan the pledge that a deadline of 180 days from July
29th 2005 for the closing of  the Karshi-Khanabad base be mentioned.  On the other
hand, and thus confirming for Beijing the risks induced by democratisation, Kyrgyzstan
has refused to comply with Beijing’s demands33.
55 Above all, despite these successes, Beijing’s influence within the SCO has been diluted.
As we have seen, China is no more than one actor among others, one on which the
Central Asian states can rely to buttress their own strategies and defend their interests,
but also one on which they are not absolutely dependent. In addition to the United
States, Russia is also counted among the external actors, and it has demonstrated its
renewed interest in the region, both against an overly invasive American presence but
also against any attempt on the part of China to make Central Asia its exclusive zone of
influence. As a Russian analyst recently underlined, for Russia the notion of a post-
Soviet area of interest remains, in particular around the core question of the control of
transit  in  matters  of  transport  or  energy,  and  Moscow  could  not  accept  the
implementation of large-scale projects from which Russia would be excluded34. From
the Russian perspective, this is as true for the United States as it is for China.
56 For  these  analysts,  as  for  the  Central  Asian  republics,  China  does  not  appear  as  a
privileged partner, despite once more the discourse on “strategic partnership”. On the
contrary, in so far as Russia can no longer play a lone hand in the region, it is the
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multiplication of actors that should ideally allow Russia and the Central Asian states a
share of initiative.
57 For its part, Japan has since 1992 also been very active in terms of development aid35
and still holds the financial keys to the most costly investments, in particular in the
field of energy. For Tokyo, too, Central Asia presents an important strategic interest
and,  in  a  sign  of  this  interest,  in  August  2004,  during  a  meeting  in Astana,  Ms
Kawaguchi,  minister  of  foreign  affairs  at  the  time,  proposed  the  initiation  of  a
“dialogue between Japan and the republics of Central Asia” to which China was not
invited. On the subject of energy issues, India is also proving to be much more active in
Central Asia, in particular in Uzbekistan, although this activism in competition with
China may also be translated in share agreements.
58 Finally, during the SCO summit held in July 2005, several “observer” members were
admitted, certain of whom, such as Pakistan and Iran, can be considered rather more
pro-China, but others of whom, including India and Mongolia, are much more sceptical
when it comes to the role of Beijing.
Conclusion
59 China’s  policy with regard to Central  Asia thus reveals  a  capacity for  adaptation,  a
flexibility and a pragmatism that contrasts with its policy for example towards Taiwan.
Beyond the search for alliances with authoritarian states that share Beijing’s distrust of
the  strategies  of  “regime  change”  initiated  by  the  United  States,  the  ideological
dimension is in effect absent from the relations between China and Central Asia.
60 The  highlighting  of  multilateralism  and  of  the  SCO  a  model  bears  witness  to  this
pragmatism. Since its creation in 2005, the SCO has undergone important evolutions;
nevertheless, the permanent objective of Beijing has been, with more or less success
and more or less room for manoeuvre, to try to orient the group in the direction of the
narrow interests of the regime both at the strategic as well as at the economic level.
61 But this supple pragmatism of China’s Central Asian policy is, in essence, testimony to
the failure of the strategy of direct influence, which was the characteristic feature of
the first phase of China’s Central Asia policy, that had preceded the terrorist attacks of
September 11th 2001. Beyond the discourse on multilateralism and the implementation
of new win-win principles in international relations,  it  is  indeed, in Central Asia as
elsewhere, the evaluations of the balance of power and the prudent consideration given
to them, in the attempt to avoid excessively costly crises, that constitute the principal
factor in the evolution of the directions that China’s external strategy is taking.
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ABSTRACTS
Despite the end of  the Cold War and the break-up of  the USSR, Central  Asia remains a core
element in the security strategy of the People’s Republic of China. This strategy, establishing a
continuum  between  China’s  internal  and  external  security,  has  evolved  from  a  strategy  of
influence following the independence of the new republics to a period of pragmatic adaptation to
developments  in  the  international  arena  after  the  terrorist  attacks  of  September  11th.  The
Shanghai  Co-operation  Organisation  (SCO)  has  emerged  as  the  instrument  for  this  flexible
strategy of adaptation, of which the economic and energy dimension has now become key.
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